Weaver did not view the lineup until 15 May , three weeks before the first trial and nine months after the murder. Following the voir dire hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress the in-court identification of defendant by Weaver but ruled that the prosecution could not offer evidence relating to the lineup. In Wade, the Supreme Court set forth several criteria with which to determine whether an in-court identification is tainted by, or independent of, an illegal lineup:.
McCraw, N. Weaver also stated that he had seen defendant on at least five or six prior occasions in the hotel lobby and that he and defendant usually had brief conversations when defendant came into the hotel to use the rest room. Weaver never identified anyone other than defendant. Furthermore, Weaver stated numerous times that the lobby was well lit and that nothing was obstructing his view of defendant when he came into the hotel.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude, as a matter of law, that Weaver's ability to identify defendant as the person he saw in the hotel on the morning of 10 August was not the product of the illegal lineup but originated independently of the illegal lineup. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting Weaver's identification testimony, notwithstanding alleged defects or irregularities in the lineup procedure.
In his next assignment of error, defendant asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that defendant's active or constructive presence at the scene of the crime is an essential element of the theories of acting in concert and aiding and abetting.
Because a trial court must instruct the jury on every essential element of an offense, defendant argues that the trial court's failure to instruct that presence is an element of acting in concert constitutes error because the witnesses at trial differed greatly on the question of whether defendant was the actual perpetrator of the crime.
Defendant further submits that the same reasoning applies to the failure to instruct that presence is an essential element of aiding and abetting. Defendant concedes that there was no objection to the trial court's instructions or a request for such an instruction, and therefore, this assignment is determined under the plain error standard of review.
Odom, N. In the present case, we find no plain error in the instructions given that would mandate a new trial in defendant's case. In the charge, the trial court instructed the jury that the burden was on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that "defendant was the perpetrator, or aided and abetted the perpetrator, or acted together with another in perpetrating the crime charged.
The trial court specifically charged the jury that in regard to finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of aiding and abetting, "a person is not guilty of a crime merely because he is present at the scene even though he may silently approve of the crime or secretly intend to assist in its commission.
The instruction on acting in concert given by the trial judge was taken from our Pattern Jury Instructions for criminal cases. See N. In addition, this Court has approved charges on acting in concert very similar to the charge in this case in State v. Gilmore, N. Williams, N. We find that the evidence in the record before us in this case overwhelmingly establishes defendant's presence and participation. The evidence of defendant's actual or constructive presence at the scene of the murder was sufficiently substantial that a charge on this feature of the case was not necessary.
Defendant has failed to show plain error in the trial judge's failure to give the requested instruction. Defendant next contends that the trial court committed error by not intervening ex mero motu to stop what defendant contends was the prosecutor's grossly improper emotional appeal to the jury during closing argument.
Defendant acknowledges that no objections were made to the portions of the prosecutor's argument to which exceptions have been entered. Defendant sets forth several portions of the prosecutor's closing argument that he claims were grossly improper. First, defendant refers to the references made by the prosecutor to the loss suffered by the victim's family.
For example, the prosecutor stated, "And Deborah Sykes' life was not just her life. Those were her clothes. Those were her shoes. But her life was not just her life.
She had a husband. She had a mother. Deborah Sykes' life belonged to all those people that cared about her.
The prosecutor said, "And lastly, whatask yourselves. What was Deborah Sykes thinking when she knelt on all fours, bleeding, gasping no doubt for breath. No doubt dying as she watched that man right there run across the field. Her assassin, her assassin. Maybe she was thinking about having a baby.
The prosecutor argued that "[i]t's time people like you stood up and you say that's enough, that's enough. We're not going to stand for it any more. Let the message ring out and let it ring out loud and clear. That's enough. The arguments of trial counsel are left largely to the control and discretion of the trial judge, and counsel will be granted wide latitude in the argument of hotly contested cases.
Soyars, N. Counsel is permitted to argue the facts that have been presented, as well as reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.
If a party fails to object to a closing argument, this Court must decide whether the argument was so improper as to warrant the trial judge's intervention ex mero motu. Craig, N. The standard of review is one of "gross impropriety. King, N. In addition, this Court has held that the prosecutor's remarks reminding the jury that for purposes of the defendant's trial, it was acting as the voice and conscience of the community are permissible.
Brown, N. We find that the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecutor's closing argument. Defendant next argues that the trial court committed prejudicial error in refusing to admit factual findings contained in a report by the city manager and an exhibit to that report which is a photo composite of defendant.
At trial, Al Beaty, the assistant city manager for Winston-Salem, testified that after the first trial in this matter, he was asked by the city manager to do a review of the Winston-Salem Police Department's investigation of the Deborah Sykes murder. Sykes Murder hereinafter the City Manager's Report. The report was released by the city manager's office on 20 November At the conclusion of Beaty's testimony, the report and an exhibit from the report were offered as evidence by the defendant.
The State's objection to defendant's request to have the report introduced into evidence was sustained. At the conclusion of the evidence for the defense, the report and exhibit were again offered into evidence, and the State's objection was again sustained.
Defendant contends that the report was admissible as substantive evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule pursuant to Rule 8 C of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence and that the judge's failure to allow the actual report into evidence constituted prejudicial error. Acklin, N. The first agent testified that a hair found on the victim's pubic region did not come from the defendant. The second agent testified that, in his opinion, the semen found on the victim's underwear did not come from the defendant.
Although the agents were permitted to testify, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objections to the introduction of their laboratory reports. In granting the defendant a new trial, this Court concluded that the reports were admissible pursuant to Rule 8 C , stating:. In the case sub judice, Beaty specifically testified that in conducting his review for the City Manager's Report, he "first analyzed and gave some study to the concerns that had been raised and the information that [he] received from Reverend Lassiter and, as a result of hearing and understanding what those concerns were, [he] sought out then to interview individuals who would have information Lassiter, Jr.
The report contained various allegations and concerns regarding the Police Department's investigation that had been shared with Reverend Lassiter by concerned citizens. Because the City Manager's Report does not fall within the Rule 8 C exception as interpreted in Acklin, we find that the trial court did not err by sustaining the State's objection to the introduction of the City Manager's Report and the exhibit from the report.
The City Manager's Report was not the result of "authority granted by law" to conduct an investigation into the Sykes' murder, there was no assurance that the report contained factual findings that would be admissible, and the report was not prepared for the purpose of being introduced against the State in a criminal case. Furthermore, the prosecution did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the persons interviewed for the report.
Because the City Manager's Report did not fit into the exception, it was hearsay and therefore properly excluded by the trial court. Defendant's next assignment of error concerns the trial court's denial of his motion to conduct an in camera inspection of an SBI investigative file.
After the first trial, the SBI and the Winston-Salem Police Department reinvestigated the case and prepared a three thousand page report on the investigation. Defendant filed a written motion for disclosure of the SBI report under Brady v. Maryland, U. The trial court denied defendant's motion for disclosure of the report.
After the commencement of the trial, the record shows that during the prosecutor's direct examination of Kevey Coleman, defense counsel requested a copy of any statement made by the witness to the SBI. The prosecutor responded that he did not have a copy in his file at the time but that he would get it and make a copy of the statement. Thereupon, defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial alleging that the prosecution had violated Brady by withholding material from the defense.
However, in his argument, defense counsel acknowledged that he had previously been provided with four statements from Coleman. Defense counsel further asserted that these statements were part of an SBI report that had been requested by the defense prior to trial, but that his request had been denied. At this point, defense counsel asked the trial court to review the SBI report to determine if there was any exculpatory material.
In response, the prosecutor informed the trial court that at this point in the trial, the defense had been provided with the statements of all of the prosecution witnesses at the conclusion of their testimony.
Following further testimony and arguments, the trial court declined to review the SBI report but ordered the State to deliver the SBI report to the trial court and to place the report under seal. During the trial, the trial court denied defendant's subsequent motion to unseal the SBI report for the limited purpose of determining whether any portion of the report constituted findings admissible under N.
As the trial continued, the prosecution provided defense counsel with copies of each witness' statement following his or her direct examination. At the conclusion of the trial, defense counsel renewed the motion to have the SBI report unsealed.
The motion was denied. In an order dated 20 July , this Court granted defendant's motion to order certification of the SBI report to this Court but denied defendant's motion to order that the report be unsealed. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for access to the SBI report or for an in camera inspection. Hardy, N. Therefore, the investigative files of the district attorney, law enforcement agencies, and others helping to prepare the case are not open to discovery.
Alston, N. The trial court did not err in refusing to order the State to disclose the SBI report to defendant. In addition, notably lacking from the list of subsections that are excluded from the scope of N. Soyars, this Court held that:. Because the prosecutor in the case sub judice provided defense counsel with prior statements made by the prosecution's witnesses after they testified on direct examination, the trial court was not required to conduct its own in camera review of the SBI report under these circumstances.
Defendant claims that the information sought was discoverable under Brady v. The United States Supreme Court has held that due process does not require the State to make complete disclosure to defendant of all of the investigative work on a case. Moore v.
Illinois, U. McLaughlin, N. Brady only requires the disclosure, upon request, of evidence favorable to the accused and not a disclosure of all evidence. Moreover, in United States v.
Agurs, U. In determining whether the suppression of certain information was violative of a defendant's right to due process, the focus should be on the effect of the nondisclosure on the outcome of the trial, not on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial.
Defendant in the case at bar has failed to establish that any evidence not disclosed from the SBI report was "material" and what effect, if any, the nondisclosure would have had on the outcome of the trial. Defendant next argues that the trial court committed reversible error by prohibiting defendant from impeaching the testimony of prosecution witness Johnny Gray under N. During cross-examination by defense counsel, Gray was asked:. After the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection, defendant made an offer of proof.
Gray verified that he had written a letter to Ford asking him to be a witness for him. At the bottom of the letter to Ford, Gray admitted that he wrote, "If you need any money, write and let me know, all right. Gray stated that he knew that Craven submitted an affidavit in the lawsuit stating that he had not witnessed any of the matters that defendant alleged in the lawsuit.
In addition, Ford sent a comparable affidavit denying any knowledge of the alleged brutality against Gray. Gray further conceded that the federal magistrate dismissed his lawsuit. After the offer of proof, the trial court again sustained the prosecution's objection to the evidence regarding the content of Gray's complaint in the lawsuit, without stating a basis for its ruling.
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by prohibiting defendant from cross-examining Gray, under Rule b , regarding the lawsuit that he had brought against law enforcement officers in which he made false allegations.
Therefore, "the only character trait relevant to the issue of credibility is veracity or the lack of it. Morgan, N. A trial court may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision. Barts, N. Assuming arguendo that there was error in the exclusion of the evidence regarding the complaint as probative of Gray's character for truthfulness, we conclude that there is no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the excluded evidence had been admitted.
In defendant's final assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred in excluding testimony by defense witness Lee Haigy regarding the basis for Lee's opinion about the untruthfulness of prosecution witness Donald Don Haigy, Lee's brother. Does [Don] tell the truth or does he not tell the truth? When asked what Don's reputation was for telling the truth, Lee responded "[h]e's a very dishonest person.
Defense counsel was permitted to proffer Lee's basis for his opinion into the record. During voir dire, Lee stated that Don would do "whatever it takes to come out ahead.
If he needs to plea bargain or whatever he needs to do, he'll do it. Defendant asserts that the basis for Lee's opinion regarding Don's character is admissible under both Rule a and Rule a of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. We find that Rule a is not applicable because Lee's responses to the questions do not relate to specific instances of conduct. Rule a provides in pertinent part that "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion as provided in Rule a.
In the case at bar, defense counsel sought to have Lee testify that he based his opinion on the fact that Don would do "whatever it takes to come out ahead. This is not evidence in the form of reputation or opinion contemplated by Rule a.
We have conducted a thorough review of the transcript of the trial and sentencing proceeding, the record on appeal, and the briefs of defendant and the State. We find no error in defendant's trial warranting reversal of defendant's conviction.
On 22 October , subsequent to the entry of judgment in the Trial Division but prior to the docketing of the appeal with this Court, defendant filed in the Superior Court, Forsyth County, a Motion for Appropriate Relief.
On 1 February , subsequent to the docketing of the appeal with this Court but prior to oral argument, defendant filed with this Court a Supplemental Motion for Appropriate Relief. On 18 February , this Court entered an order remanding defendant's Supplemental Motion to the Superior Court, Forsyth County, consolidating the same with defendant's previously filed Motion of 22 October and ordering that court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motions filed 22 October and 1 February Morgan, Jr.
On 1 July , pursuant to a motion filed 29 June to amend our 18 February order, this Court entered an additional order directing an in camera review of the SBI report.
Defendant subsequently filed with the trial court an Amendment to Supplemental Motion for Appropriate Relief dated 15 October and thereafter, on 17 November , filed with the trial court a Second Amendment to Supplemental Motion for Appropriate Relief. On 22 through 24 and 29 November , Judge Morgan held additional hearings. On 12 August , he entered a page order making appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law and denying each of defendant's motions.
On 8 September , this Court granted in part defendant's Motion for Supplemental Briefing and Oral Argument, set a briefing schedule, and denied defendant's request for oral argument on the motion.
Defendant subsequently filed additional motions in the Superior Court, Forsyth County, and filed with this Court a Motion to Toll Appeal, attaching his recently filed Superior Court motions.
On 26 October , this Court allowed defendant's Motion to Toll Appeal, treated defendant's attached motions as an amendment to defendant's original 22 October Motion for Appropriate Relief, and remanded the same for an evidentiary hearing before Judge Morgan.
Following an evidentiary hearing on 7 November , Judge Morgan denied defendant's subsequently filed motions by order dated 10 November Defendant's Motion for Appropriate Relief as supplemented and amended as heretofore described is denied. Judge Morgan's orders of 12 August and 10 November are hereby affirmed in all respects.
I dissent from that portion of the Court's opinion which adopts the findings and conclusions of law contained in Judge Morgan's orders of 12 August and 10 November and denies defendant's motion for appropriate relief.
I agree with Judge Morgan's conclusion that defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied. A defendant seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence has a heavy burden to meet. As we said in State v. Britt, N. I believe defendant has established each of the seven prerequisites in this case.
Judge Morgan, after conducting appropriate hearings and listening to the arguments of counsel, found that defendant had met the first six of these prerequisites, but not the seventh.
The seventh prerequisite to obtaining a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence is that the newly discovered evidence "is of such a nature as to show that on another trial a different result will probably be reached and that the right will prevail.
Judge Morgan found that "the newly discovered evidence is not of such a nature as to show that a different result, i. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder under the felony murder rule, on the bases that the murder occurred in the perpetration of four felonies: robbery with a dangerous weapon, rape, sexual offense, and kidnapping. The hearing judge found that while "the State's theory on rape and sexual offense is somewhat weakened by the DNA evidence, its case overall is not fatally flawed.
Thus, I would hold that defendant has established the seventh prerequisite to a new trial: that the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature as to show that on another trial a different result will probably be reached and that the right will prevail. Upon motion by defendant for reconsideration, the mandate was temporarily stayed 19 January pending further orders of the Court. Defendant's motion for reconsideration was denied 2 March Hunt Annotate this Case.
Supreme Court of North Carolina. December 30, Mandate March 2, Easley, Atty. Bryant, Sp. Deputy Atty. However, the Court specifically noted: In this case we need not and do not question the general evidentiary rule that a defendant's testimony at a former trial is admissible in evidence against him in later proceedings.
A defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives, and that waiver is no less effective or complete because the defendant may have been motivated to take the witness stand in the first place only by reason of the strength of the lawful evidence adduced against him.
The relevant portion of the prosecutor's argument is as follows: And here's another thing that made me real happy. I put three stars right by this one. He talked about, quote, the State put in [defendant's] transcript and then he said and I put it in quotes, underline[d] it. After the State put in [defendant's] transcript, he said, thereafterremember this word, thereafter, we decided not to have [defendant] testify. That's important. When did these two lawyers decide not to have [defendant] testify?
It wasn't before; it wasn't during; it was thereafter. Now, ask yourselves that question. These two fine lawyers here, why would they wait to make that decision thereafter? I'll tell you why they waited to make it. He was in a box.
Right here's the box. Right here's what he said back in and thereafter. In case he wanted to change horses, that pretty much eliminated that, didn't it? If his alibi was a nag through this trial, maybe he had an idea of crawling on a thoroughbred up here in Hickory.
During the charge conference, defendant requested that the trial judge give the following instruction: A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on reason and common sense, arising out of some or all of the evidence that has been presented, or lack or insufficiency of the evidence, as the case may be. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that fully satisfies or entirely convinces you of the defendant's guilt. Instead, the trial court charged: A reasonable doubt, members of the jury, is not a mere possible doubt[,] for most things that relate to human affairs are open to some possible or imaginary doubt.
But rather a reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason and common sense and growing out of some evidence or lack of evidence in the case. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 1 Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding The following colloquy took place between defense counsel and Weaver: Q.
All right. Well, againNow, when you were asked about this under oath back in , you testified that you based your identification in court on the lineup in addition to what you say you saw on the 10th in the hotel; isn't that right? I didn't base it but I confirmed. I would use the word confirm. Well, let's look at the word you used back in June of , Mr.
On page at line 4 you were asked, "Are you basing your identification of [defendant] here in court today based on what you saw on August 10 or something you saw afterwards? Repeated appeals met the same fate. The results matched a man incarcerated for another murder.
Hunt was exonerated and freed in Willard E. Brown, the man whose DNA matched the profile at the crime scene, has since pleaded guilty to the murder of Deborah Sykes. In , Hunt founded the Darryl Hunt Project for Freedom and Justice, a nonprofit organization dedicated to educating the public about criminal justice reform opportunities, advocating for the wrongfully convicted, and providing resources to support individuals who were recently released from prison.
Tragically, Hunt committed suicide in North Carolina in March of He was 51 years old. Help us advocate for the innocent by sharing cases from the Innocence Project. Press Release.
Special Features. Darryl Hunt Time Served: 19 Years. Read all. Sign In. Play trailer Documentary Crime. Directors Ricki Stern Anne Sundberg. Ricki Stern uncredited Anne Sundberg uncredited. See more at IMDbPro. Trailer The Trials of Darryl Hunt. Photos 2. Add photo. Top cast Edit. Ricki Stern Anne Sundberg. More like this. Storyline Edit. With exclusive footage from two decades, the film frames the judicial and emotional response to a chilling crime - and the implications that reverberate from Hunt's conviction - against a backdrop of class and racial bias in the South and in the American criminal justice system.
This documentary is the culmination of ten years of research and filming. In , inspired by claims of injustice and police conspiracy, the filmmakers began to shoot in North Carolina.
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